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Introduction 
After allegations that Harvey Weinstein had sexually assaulted 
many women appeared on the front page of the New York Times in 
October of 2017,1 the #MeToo movement began in earnest.2 Nowadays, 
allegations implicating #MeToo concerns as to a company’s employee, 
whether or not involving illegal behavior, may result in swift firing or 
reprimand; in any event, such allegations cannot appear to be taken 
lightly lest the company’s reputation suffer. Lawsuits and shareholder 
activism are increasingly focusing on “toxic” “boys club” cultures at 
 
†  Professor and James L. Krusemark Chair in Law, University of Minnesota 
Law School. Thanks to the participants at the 2018 Leet Symposium on 
Fiduciary Duty at Case Western Reserve University Law School, and 
June Carbone, Scott Dewey, Sean Griffth, Eric Hillemann, and Joe 
McGrath for very useful input on this project. 
1. See Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual 
Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. Times (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html 
[https://perma.cc/4RQA-KHLG]. 
2. See, e.g., Christen A. Johnson & KT Hawbaker, #Me Too: A Timeline of 
Events, Chi. Trib., (Mar. 7, 2019, 9:43 AM), https://www.chicagotribune. 
com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html [https://perma. 
cc/65CZ-KAB4]; Me Too Movement, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Me_Too_movement [https://perma.cc/QD5X-HAP9] (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2019). 
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workplaces,3 and going beyond misconduct to consider other issues 
relating to gender such as board diversity.4 
This development has broader implications for the debate as to 
whose interests corporations should be serving: should corporations be 
solely or primarily focused on profits for shareholders or should they 
also be taking into account the interests of other stakeholders? In 
previous work, I have argued that the increasing emphasis on corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) concerns is leading to a convergence between these supposed 
alternatives; here, I make the case with specific reference to #MeToo, 
outlining a rhetorical strategy by which the convergence might be more 
successful. 
 
3. See Kevin LaCroix, Nike Board Hit with Sexual Misconduct-Related Derivative 
Suit, D&O Diary (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/10/ 
articles/director-and-officer-liability/nike-board-hit-sexual-misconduct-
related-derivative-suit/ [https://perma.cc/9N7L-J7LB] [hereinafter LaCroix, 
Nike Board] (reporting shareholder lawsuit against Nike’s Board of 
Directors that alleges Nike’s board allowed a “toxic ‘boys club’ culture”); 
David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update: 
Shareholder Activism is the Next Phase of #MeToo, Harv. L. Sch. F. 
on Corp. Governance and Fin. Reg. (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/28/corporate-governance-update-
shareholder-activism-is-the-next-phase-of-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/MDW8- 
6AKS] (describing recent shareholder proposals regarding sexual 
harassment, gender diversity, and the gender pay gap); Ryan Vlastelica, 
Why the Wave of Sexual Harassment Allegations Won’t Have an Impact 
on Stock Prices, MarketWatch (Dec. 15, 2017, 3:14 PM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-the-wave-of-sexual-harassment-
allegations-wont-have-an-impact-on-stock-prices-2017-12-15 [https://perma. 
cc/MAE5-TQ24] (referencing sexual-misconduct related lawsuits against 
companies such as Netflix, Amazon, and CBS); Tag Archives: Sexual 
Harassment, D&O Diary, https://www.dandodiary.com/tags/sexual-
harassment/ [https://perma.cc/U868-ZNSX] (last visited Mar. 25, 2019) 
(listing articles on sexual-misconduct related law suits); Peter J. Biging 
& Heather M. Zimmer, Corporate D&O Liability and Sexual Harassment 
in the Workplace, Am. Bar Ass’n. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2018/november
-2018/corporate-d-o-liability-sexual-harassment-workplace/ [https://perma. 
cc/KY3F-G37L] (referencing lawsuits brought by investors for the manner 
in which company boards have handled sexual harassment allegations). 
4. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 3; American Business and #MeToo, 
Economist (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.economist.com/business/2018/ 
09/27/american-business-and-metoo [https://perma.cc/TSZ5-387X]; see also 
Equileap, https://equileap.org/ [https://perma.cc/E6S6-RFE5] (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2019) (discussing Equileap, a global organization that advocates 
for gender equality in the corporate sector). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 4·2019 
#MeToo and the Convergence of CSR and Profit Maximization 
897 
I. Sexual Misconduct 
Since the #MeToo movement began in earnest, many business 
executives, media figures, and other prominent people have been subject 
to allegations of sexual misconduct.5 What has happened to these 
people? There have been a range of responses, some more serious, and 
some more warranted than others.6 As noted above, it is clear that 
behavior that was once acceptable no longer is. Indeed, some of the 
more serious misconduct seems to have been an open secret,7 but the 
executives responsible for  the misconduct were nevertheless signed to 
new employment agreements.8 What the board knew in some of the 
cases may be litigated, but there are indications of some level of board 
knowledge in at least the Weinstein case and perhaps in the 
comparatively less egregious case of Les Moonves, now-former CEO of 
 
5. Post-Weinstein, These Are the Powerful Men Facing Sexual Harassment 
Allegations, Glamour (Dec. 1, 2018), https://www.glamour.com/gallery/ 
post-weinstein-these-are-the-powerful-men-facing-sexual-harassment-
allegations [https://perma.cc/XD23-LR2V] (listing nearly 100 famous 
men accused of sexual misconduct). 
6. See id. (detailing both the general fallout and the accused’s reactions to 
sexual misconduct allegations against public figures). Allegations are easy 
to make, and the set of people alleged to have committed sexual 
misconduct is surely not coextensive with the set of people who have 
actually done so, nor is it even a subset of those people. 
7. See infra note 9 and accompanying text. 
8. See Harvey Weinstein Employment Agreement, available at https:// 
www.documentcloud.org/documents/4495391-Weinstein-Employment.html 
[https://perma.cc/7ZQ7-CJ6Y] (showing that Weinstein’s employment 
contract was renewed in 2015, years after Weinstein had been known by 
several prominent figures to have acted inappropriately, and included 
provisions apparently evidencing an awareness that Weinstein might 
commit misconduct); Leslie Moonves Employment Agreement, available 
at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/813828/000119312507222104/ 
dex10.htm [https://perma.cc/3VK5-7K7L]. 
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CBS, as well.9 Weinstein is potentially facing ruinous criminal and civil 
liability.10 Moonves, by contrast, is doing much better: 
Just months after being fired by CBS, Leslie Moonves is running 
a new company. And though Mr. Moonves and his former 
employer are locked in a dispute over $120 million in severance, 
CBS is paying for the office space that Mr. Moonves now occupies. 
The company, Moon Rise Unlimited, operates out of a 10th-floor 
suite at 9000 Sunset Boulevard, among the tallest buildings in 
West Hollywood. A glass-sheathed office tower with expansive 
views of Los Angeles, it can be seen from miles away and is near 
entertainment industry beehives like Soho House and Chateau 
Marmont. Mr. Moonves was forced out of CBS in September after 
multiple women accused him of sexual misconduct. In December, 
the company officially said he was fired, citing “willful and 
material misfeasance, violation of company policies and breach of 
his employment contract.” His exit agreement, however, states 
that CBS must pay for Mr. Moonves’s “office services” for no less 
than a year, even if the company fired him for cause. CBS 
declined to comment.11 
This account, notwithstanding being in the news section of a 
prominent newspaper, seems to convey the reporter’s disapproval. 
Moonves was accused of serious misconduct yet was able to negotiate 
an exit agreement under which he receives significant benefits. And 
Moonves would, apparently, have a case that he is entitled to receive  
9. Yohana Desta, What Exactly, Did the Weinstein Company Know About the 
Harvey Weinstein Allegations?, Vanity Fair (Oct. 12, 2017), https:// 
www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2017/10/harvey-weinstein-company-lawyer 
[https://perma.cc/4EVE-KSX8] (suggesting that Weinstein’s board knew 
of confidential settlement agreements between Weinstein and women in 
2015); Dade Hayes & Nancy Tartaglione, Weinstein Co. Board Has 
Known About Payoffs to Women Since 2015: Report, Deadline (Oct. 12, 
2017), https://deadline.com/2017/10/weinstein-co-board-knew-payoffs-to- 
women-since-2015-report-1202186928/ [https://perma.cc/76PX-L9AK]; CBS 
Higher-Ups Knew of CEO Leslie Moonves’ Sexual Misconduct and Did 
Nothing, Report Finds, Women World (Dec. 5, 2018), https:// 
womenintheworld.com/2018/12/05/cbs-higher-ups-knew-of-ceo-leslie-
moonves-sexual-misconduct-and-did-nothing-report-finds/ [https://perma.cc/ 
62G8-JQNJ] (indicating that a CBS board member was privately 
informed of Moonves’ misconduct in 2007). 
10. Jan Ransom, 5 Ways Harvey Weinstein’s Lawyers Plan to Fight the 
Accusations Against Him, N.Y. Times (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/09/21/nyregion/weinstein-sexual-assault-defense.html 
[https://perma.cc/DT6H-5BMY].  
11. David Gelles et al., Les Moonves, Fired by CBS, Sets Up Shop in 
Hollywood, N.Y. Times (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
02/08/business/media/les-moonves-moonrise.html [https://perma.cc/6AUR- 
6Y56]. 
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his $120 million severance. There are many media reports that criticize 
the possibility that he could receive severance under these 
circumstances.12 
This outcome is in part a story of CEO employment agreements 
that make firings for cause very difficult indeed.13 For instance, often, 
being convicted of a misdemeanor, or being indicted on felony charges 
but not being convicted, does not yield for-cause firing.14 One article 
suggests that Moonves not getting severance “could signal a shift in the 
#MeToo quest to hold abusers accountable—a new data point that 
gives the existing scatter plot coherent shape.”15 
It will be interesting to see what the lawsuits and other pressures 
yield. Certainly, there have been firings, and interestingly, many of the 
 
12. See, e.g., Vanessa Romo, CBS Denies Former CEO Les Moonves $120 
Million Severance Package, NPR (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.npr.org/ 
2018/12/17/677587813/cbs-denies-former-ceo-les-moonves-120-million-
severance-package [https://perma.cc/GLV7-DTR6] (explaining that CBS 
fired Moonves for cause and he is not entitled to severance). But see 
Bloomberg, Les Moonves Wants His $120 Million Severance and He’s 
Going to Fight CBS for It, Fortune (Jan. 17, 2019), fortune.com/ 
2019/01/17/les-moonves-cbs-severance/ [https://perma.cc/JX52-8N6Y] 
(stating that Moonves is demanding arbitration following CBS’s decision 
to withhold severance).  
13. See generally Robert A.G. Monks & Nell Minow, Corporate 
Governance 269–70 (5th ed. 2011) (noting that in the backdrop of the 
famous case In Re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 
693 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005), Disney could not justify for-cause termination 
of Ovitz, even though there was general consensus that Ovitz had not 
done a great job); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good 
Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J. Corp. L. 833 (2007).  
14. See Mark J. Oberti, 5 Things All Execs Should Have in Employment 
Agreements, The Bus. J. (Aug. 29, 2013, 7:00 A.M. EDT), https:// 
www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/how-to/human-resources/2013/01/5-
things-all-execs-should-have-in.html [https://perma.cc/JXS3-YH5G] 
(advising executives to seek narrow definitions of “cause” for termination 
in their employment agreements, covering only “conviction of a felony, 
embezzlement, theft or gross misconduct connected with work”); see, e.g., 
Harvey Weinstein Employment Agreement, supra note 8, at 12–13; Leslie 
Moonves Employment Agreement, supra note 8, at 13–14 .  
15. Mary Childs, How Les Moonves’ Zero Tolerance Could Be a Turning 
Point in Harassment Suits, Barron’s (Dec. 21, 2018, 7:58 PM ET), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/how-les-moonves-severance-could-change-
the-math-of-sexual-harassment-suits-51545440338 [https://perma.cc/2PWX- 
8B4B]. 
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men fired have been replaced by women.16 Female representation seems 
to be increasing on boards as well.17 
II. Profit Maximizing Firms and Sexual Misconduct 
Corporations have duties to their shareholders, notably, to earn 
profits. But to whom else do they owe duties, and what do those duties 
entail? Different people have different views about this issue and, 
ultimately, many of the differences are matters of first principle, not 
really amenable to resolution.18 The question we can approach, though, 
is: what maximizes profits? Obviously, companies spend enormous 
amounts of time considering this question, and they proceed according 
to their best assessment of the answer. 
I am presently exploring whether certain business practices that 
seem to increase profits by reducing costs might have ancillary effects 
that limit, if not eliminate, the effect of the cost reductions. Imagine 
trying to save money on wages by hiring Worker B for 50 percent of 
the wage of the previous Worker A, only to find out that Worker B is 
less than 50 percent as productive as Worker A. Worker A may have 
friends who might shun the business, not being willing to  work or shop 
there. Worker B's income is, by hypothesis, quite low, and he may not 
be particularly well-disposed to his company. The aggregate effect may 
be that the labor cost savings may be more than offset by increased 
production costs, increased costs in finding employees, and reduced 
demand. Worker B, who was ostensibly saving money for the company, 
turns out to ultimately cost money instead.  
Another example involves a company's imposition of overly 
aggressive sales targets. Such targets may encourage overly aggressive 
sales tactics. The result may be that more honest employees quit and 
are replaced by employees whose willingness to lie for the company 
might be matched by their willingness to lie to the company. A third 
example hits closer to the topic of this Article: a company’s assessment 
that a particular executive who engages in sexual or other misconduct 
brings value to the company that outweighs the costs of the behavior. 
The behavior may be worse than what the company thinks it is 
overlooking, or its assessment of how the behavior will be regarded once 
it becomes known may understate the costs, which may include 
 
16. Audrey Carlson et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half 
of Their Replacements Are Women., N.Y. Times (Oct. 29, 2018), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html 
[https://perma.cc/7DRM-KJ2R]. 
17. Quick Take: Women on Corporate Boards, Catalyst (Dec. 21, 2018), 
https://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-corporate-boards [https:// 
perma.cc/G3HM-8RLJ]. 
18. Claire A. Hill, An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long-Term Investor 
Debate, 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 475, 475–76 (2018). 
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penalties, increased regulatory scrutiny, and other results of 
reputational loss. 
In the face of pressure from various realms, even a company taking 
the position that its only stakeholders are shareholders seeking profit 
could conclude that profit maximization is not always furthered by 
aggressive cost-reduction or revenue-maximization strategies or by not 
punishing (or even rewarding) its executives notwithstanding the 
executives’ bad behavior. Especially as to the latter, but to some extent 
also as to the former, even a profit-maximizing company would not 
want to be caught making precise computations as to respects in which 
it gets close to, or perhaps crosses, a line (usually of legality, but 
perhaps even morality). Imagine a company being caught having made 
an assessment that the expected benefits of an “interaction” with 
Government Official X are $10,000, whereas the expected costs, 
including as to the possibility that the “interaction” is considered a 
bribe, are $8,000. Or, imagine a company being caught making an 
assessment that whatever settlement monies it has to pay for Harvey 
Weinstein’s conduct were worth it, given how valuable an employee he 
was. Thus, even on profit maximization grounds, a company might 
want to estimate the costs associated with sensitive matters less 
conservatively.19 
Certainly, as to conduct in the general category addressed by 
#MeToo, it seems likely that more generous assessments of expected 
costs are being made. Companies are now going further than a more 
conservative cost/benefit analysis would suggest in attempting to 
prevent, minimize, or ex post address the conduct. They are, perhaps, 
making a generous computation as to the reputational cost if sexual 
misconduct by a top official is discovered (and probably even if credibly 
alleged). In fact, we do not really know what the bottom-line effect of 
sexual misconduct allegations on a company will be. Some of the worst 
stock price effects seem to reflect not so much the misconduct itself, 
but rather the anticipated departure of the executive whom markets 
had perceived as valuable.20 Harvey Weinstein’s company went into 
bankruptcy. But in that case, the allegations were numerous, serious, 
and credible, and the company was so closely associated with Weinstein 
 
19. Claire A. Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 Temple L. Rev. 681, 687–88 
(2018); Claire A. Hill, Marshalling Reputation to Limit Problematic 
Business Conduct, 99 B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019). 
20. See Ryan Vlastelica, Why the Wave of Sexual Harassment Allegations 
Won’t Have an Impact on Stock Prices, MarketWatch (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-the-wave-of-sexual-harassment-
allegations-wont-have-an-impact-on-stock-prices-2017-12-15 [https:// 
perma.cc/P7BE-XZYD] (noting, for example, a dip in 21st Century Fox 
Inc.’s stock after former network chairman Roger Ailes was accused of 
sexual misconduct and then subsequently departed the company). 
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that, once he was terminated, there was virtually nothing left.21 That 
being said, however, the situation is dynamic. An important part of the 
#MeToo story is that behavior that was previously tolerated no longer 
is. My own life experience provides data points for this proposition. In 
my practice experience in the 1980s, suggestive remarks, gestures, and 
invitations of certain sorts by male clients directed at female lawyers 
were common and considered unremarkable; nowadays, it is apparently 
far more remarked upon (and less accepted). Will investors start doing 
more to punish firms that are considered not to be taking #MeToo 
seriously enough? And what are the costs of regulatory and “public” 
disfavor to a firm?22 We don't know. Finally, whatever the effect on 
investors, regulators, and others, the costs of “managing” the crisis 
might be factored in as well, again supporting spending more to prevent 
or limit difficulties. 
The foregoing argues that even a profit-maximizing firm might do 
more than a conservative instrumental calculation might suggest in 
order to prevent or minimize the costs of certain #MeToo harms. Firms 
that characterize themselves as profit-maximizing, concerned only 
about profits and shareholders, might go further for reasons of 
managerial agency costs: going further might benefit the directors more 
than the firm, insofar as the directors were also taking costs to 
themselves into account. 
What sort of costs? To some extent, the “costs” are ones that the 
law wants them to take into account: the costs of personal liability for 
engaging in or not doing enough to prevent illegal conduct. “Pure” 
theory would regard these as agency costs, while any kind of ordinary 
understanding would not. If the expected benefit of bribing official A 
or concealing the criminal conduct of executive B is positive after taking 
into account the costs, notably the size of the bribe, the executive’s 
salary, and the probability of detection and punishment of the firm, 
 
21. Weinstein was terminated on October 8, 2017, and the company declared 
bankruptcy in March 2018. Brooks Barnes, Harvey Weinstein, Fired on 
Oct. 8, Resigns From Company’s Board, N.Y. Times (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/business/media/harvey-weinstein-
sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/VZF9-R84S]; Brooks Barnes, 
Weinstein Company Files for Bankruptcy and Revokes Nondisclosure 
Agreements, N.Y. Times (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
03/19/business/weinstein-company-bankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/ 
TKA4-8JRW]. 
22. See John Armour et al., Putting Technology to Good Use for Society: The 
Role of Corporate, Competition and Tax Law 9–10 (European Corp. 
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 427/2018), https://ecgi.global/sites/ 
default/files/working_papers/documents/finalarmourenriquesezrachivella1. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/YFU8-TTLS] (discussing the distinction between 
market reputation and political reputation). 
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then the perfect agent would bribe/conceal. 23 But of course, this 
reasoning is to be rejected; we cannot countenance directors’ 
participation or facilitation of law breaking even if doing so would yield 
profit for their corporations. This reasoning should also allow directors 
to go beyond the minimum necessary in this context. A recent paper, 
summarized by the authors in the following blog post, discusses the 
types of claims that could be made against directors in relation to sexual 
harassment by company executives: 
In our article, “Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law,” we 
identify various legal arguments available to shareholders who 
seek to hold directors and officers responsible for corporate sexual 
misconduct. We conclude that in some instances, corporate 
fiduciaries will indeed be liable to shareholders when workplace-
based sexual misconduct occurs at their companies. First and 
most straightforwardly, corporate fiduciaries violate their duties 
of care and loyalty when they engage in harassment themselves—
and thus put the firm’s resources and reputation at risk for their 
own personal gratification. Second, fiduciaries who fail to monitor 
harassment at their firms may be liable in certain circumstances 
under a Caremark theory. Third, corporate fiduciaries who are 
aware of harassment but fail to react—or who affirmatively 
enable harassment to continue—may be sued for breach of the 
duties of care and loyalty, though this is the category in which 
the doctrinal case for liability is likely the weakest. Fourth, 
corporations and their officers and directors face potential 
liability under the federal securities statutes when they make 
 
23. Directors breach their fiduciary duties if they engage in conduct involving 
illegality (that is, engaging in it themselves or being culpable for not 
ferreting it out, as is alleged in Caremark cases) even if on balance there 
is a net profit for the corporation, an issue Brett McDonnell and I discuss 
in Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1769, 1784 (2007). We argue that most fiduciary duties are a way 
for shareholders to limit directors’ and officers’ ability and incentive to 
benefit themselves at the expense of their corporation, but:  
a stark divergence between directors’ interests and those of 
shareholders is not in any obvious way what is at issue. Illegal 
behavior may very well maximize corporate profits; indeed, we 
would expect that it often would. Paying an illegal bribe in 
country Z is intended to get you more business in country Z. 
Often, a company’s (non-U.S.) competitors are not subject to 
antibribery rules, and if the U.S. executive follows the rules, he 
will lose business to the competitor that can bribe without fear of 
legal sanction.  
Id. 
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inaccurate or misleading statements regarding workplace sexual 
misconduct.24  
Firms that characterize themselves as profit-maximizing might go 
further for other reasons as well. Directors are concerned about their 
reputations and might take #MeToo preventing and minimizing steps 
for that reason. Is that an agency cost? Again, assuming that the firm’s 
aims are characterized as profit maximization for shareholders, one 
could characterize the directors’ actions as an agency cost insofar as 
what they are doing benefits their individual reputations (and perhaps 
saves them the trouble of defending their reputations) rather than 
benefiting the firm. 
III. Beyond Sexual Misconduct 
The advent of the #MeToo movement has brought together and 
made more salient as one phenomenon issues surrounding women in the 
workplace. As two commentators explain: 
As the #MeToo movement continues to make itself felt in all 
facets of American life, public company boards of directors that 
are newly focused on the issue of workplace harassment have seen 
corporate responses evolve. In recent months, many boards have 
overseen the addition of anti-harassment policies to corporate 
codes of conduct, the establishment of procedures for addressing 
allegations, and the enhancement of employee training at all 
 
24. Daniel Hemel & Dorothy Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 
CLS Blue Sky Blog (Apr. 9, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/ 
2018/04/09/sexual-harassment-and-corporate-law/ [https://perma.cc/XF4L- 
PWKB]. Some of the lawsuits include securities law claims alleging that 
companies did not disclose the problematic behavior of one or more 
executives (Wynn Resorts; CBS); alleging that the directors breached 
their fiduciary duties in not preventing such behavior and in attempting 
to conceal it (Nike; 21st Century Fox); and alleging that executives were 
rewarded for engaging in such behavior with generous severance packages 
that caused employees to revolt (Google/Alphabet, for example). Kevin 
M. LaCroix, Sexual Misconduct and D&O Claims, D&O Diary (Apr. 11, 
2018), https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/04/articles/director-and-officer-
liability/sexual-misconduct-claims/ [https://perma.cc/UGW6-5QJ7]; Kevin 
M. LaCroix, Investor Files Sexual Misconduct-Related Securities Suit 
Against CBS, D&O Diary (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.dandodiary. 
com/2018/08/articles/securities-litigation/investor-files-sexual-misconduct-
related-securities-suit-cbs/ [https://perma.cc/Q98Q-NK9N]; LaCroix, 
Nike Board, supra note 3; Kevin M. LaCroix, Alphabet Board Hit with 
Derivative Suits over Alleged Sexual Misconduct at Google, D&O Diary 
(Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.dandodiary.com/2019/01/articles/director-
and-officer-liability/alphabet-board-hit-derivative-suits-alleged-sexual-
misconduct-google/ [https://perma.cc/DTM4-P562] [hereinafter LaCroix, 
Alphabet].  
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levels. Directors are taking proactive steps toward educating 
themselves and looking deeply into the issues involved, and many 
have highlighted it as a priority for the senior management team. 
Boards that have successfully installed the nuts and bolts of good 
governance in this area can now step back and consider the larger 
project of gender equality in corporate America, in which sexual 
harassment, corporate culture, gender pay equity, and gender 
diversity are related issues. Shareholder activity in all four of 
these areas—which we will call collectively, “corporate 
equality”—has markedly increased, and boards looking ahead to 
the next phase of corporate governance activism should take note 
of this trend and try to be proactive as opposed to reactive.25 
Another commentator speaks to the role of sexual harassment 
lawsuits in this regard: 
[One of the cases against Google] not only refers to sexual 
misconduct involving Google executives, but also refers to the 
sexual discrimination in the male-dominated company culture 
that the complaint alleges has resulted in gender based pay and 
advancement disparity. The shareholder derivative lawsuit filed 
last summer against Nike . . . raised similar gender disparity 
allegations. The issue of gender-based pay disparity is an arguably 
related but different issue than the kinds of over sexual 
misconduct and harassment issues on which many of the 
#MeToo-related D&O lawsuits are based.  
If the focus of the #MeToo social media movement were to 
move more generally from the sexual misconduct-type allegations 
and more toward gender based pay and advancement disparity, 
the wave of revelations could sweep much more broadly and the 
scope of the follow-on litigation could expand significantly as 
well.26 
The author points out that two of the complaints in the cases 
against Google “refer to a toxic male-dominated culture.” He notes that 
“‘brogrammer culture’ . . . is not found just at Google . . . . [T]he 
implication is that the toxic conditions at Google can be found at other 
tech companies—which in turn suggests that other tech companies also 
could find themselves the target of this kind of litigation.”27 
 
25. David A. Katz et al., Corporate Governance Update: Shareholder 
Activism Is the Next Phase of #MeToo, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. 
Governance and Fin. Reg., (Sept. 28, 2018), https://corpgov.law. 
harvard.edu/2018/09/28/corporate-governance-update-shareholder-activism-
is-the-next-phase-of-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/2E8E-HYJB]. 
26. LaCroix, Alphabet, supra note 24. 
27. Id. 
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This suggests that various pressures are being brought to bear to 
encourage companies not just to minimize or prevent sexual 
misconduct, but also, to deal more broadly with problems associated 
with women in the workplace, at both junior and senior levels. In an 
almost tautological way, so long as the efforts requested of companies 
are not that costly and also do not affirmatively harm their profit-
making missions, these efforts could be consistent with profit 
maximization for shareholders as the sole corporate mission. If, for 
instance, having some percentage of women on a board is not 
demonstrably bad for profits and if the constituencies making the 
request have to be attended to (if, for instance, they are major 
shareholders), the company surely is not going against its profit-
maximizing mission to assent. Because the matters at issue are difficult 
to investigate, it will not be possible to determine with enough certainty 
what effect women on boards have on profitability; thus, it will not be 
clear whether or not profitability is positively or adversely affected, 
leaving room for other pressures to affect decisions as to board 
composition.28 
A similar stance can be taken regarding the effect of any of these 
initiatives on reputation. What does (and does not) and would (and 
would not) affect reputation is the subject of considerable debate. Given 
the complexities involved and the dynamic nature of the issue and 
reactions to it, it is easy to couch a comprehensive program addressing 
many #MeToo issues, such as the avoidance of sexual misconduct and 
harassment, the encouragement of “good” things such as diversity on 
boards, and, perhaps, pay equality for women, as consistent with profit 
maximization. 
IV. Returning to Profit Maximization and CSR 
In 2018, Larry Fink, CEO of Blackrock and one of the biggest 
institutional investors in the world, wrote a letter to CEOs that has 
been quite influential as a call to corporations to act more for the long 
term and more in the public interest. 
Society is demanding that companies, both public and private, 
serve a social purpose. To prosper over time, every company must 
not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it 
makes a positive contribution to society. Companies must benefit 
all of their stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, 
 
28. Does Gender Diversity on Boards Really Boost Company Performance?, 
Knowledge@Wharton (May 18, 2017), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn. 
edu/article/will-gender-diversity-boards-really-boost-company-performance/ 
[https://perma.cc/N3AC-DMN8] (summarizing studies about the impact 
of having women on corporate boards and concluding that the results do 
not indicate a negative impact to businesses with women on the board). 
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customers, and the communities in which they operate. Without 
a sense of purpose, no company, either public or private, can 
achieve its full potential.29 
Fink also made the case for boards that are diverse, including as to 
gender: 
We also will continue to emphasize the importance of a diverse 
board. Boards with a diverse mix of genders, ethnicities, career 
experiences, and ways of thinking have, as a result, a more diverse 
and aware mindset. They are less likely to succumb to groupthink 
or miss new threats to a company’s business model. And they are 
better able to identify opportunities that promote long-term 
growth.30 
Some commentators have suggested that Fink’s letter is just “good 
PR.”31 There are also respects in which, notwithstanding his “all things 
to all people” language, there are real tensions at issue and very difficult 
societal questions—that being “all things to all people” is not actually 
possible and perhaps not even desirable. And finally, there are very real 
questions as to what is in society’s interests. Still, especially with 
memories and traces of the 2008 financial crisis remaining, there is a 
general sense that corporations have sometimes been forces for harm 
and could, many believe should, be forces for good. 
But what does that entail beyond avoiding harm? Some 
commentators argue—or even assert—that corporations should, for 
reasons of good corporate citizenship or for some other like reason, go 
what some might consider “above and beyond.” Not surprisingly, a 
search for the term “Corporate Social Responsibility” on Google yields 
245,000,000 hits;32 a search for “Environmental Social Governance” 
yields 233,000,000 hits.33 Many commentators argue or simply assume 
that corporations “should” engage in certain “good” behaviors “because 
 
29. Larry Fink, Larry Fink's 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, 
BlackRock (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/ 
2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/H5MT-4WF8].  
30. Id. 
31. See, e.g., Jeff Hauser & Eleanor Eagan, BlackRock’s ‘Greenwashing’ 
Threatens to Undermine Climate Action, Am. Prospect (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://prospect.org/article/blackrocks-greenwashing-threatens-undermine-
climate-action [https://perma.cc/6894-F7QR]. 
32. Corporate Social Responsibility, Google, www.google.com (search for 
“Corporate Social Responsibility”) [https://perma.cc/47SL-M7X9] (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2019). 
33. Environmental Social Governance, Google, www.google.com (search for 
“Environmental Social Governance”) [https://perma.cc/ZY8N-HQBN] 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2019).  
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it is the right thing to do,” whether or not those behaviors are profit 
maximizing. My argument here suggests that the relationship between 
these behaviors and profit maximization is not straightforward and that 
the supposed tension may be overstated.  
My broader aim is to argue that costs associated with certain types 
of behaviors, notably including additional reputational costs and the 
costs of potential legal liability and regulatory disfavor, are such that 
firms will have profit-maximizing reasons to minimize the behaviors.   
But doesn’t my reasoning support giving weight to any sort of 
strong pressure by a constituency against an entity, whether or not the 
pressure is for something “good” for the broader society?34 Companies 
could deal with pressures from #MeToo instrumentally and 
atomistically. They could determine, crudely, that they will listen to 
the louder and seemingly more important and influential pressures and 
either follow their dictates or appear to do so, focusing on harm 
minimization and taking some affirmative steps that the company 
decides are sufficiently warranted or will appease enough of the right 
people. That is, they could respond narrowly. But alternatively, they 
could also take up Fink’s charge, and the broader charge of the 
increasing forces favoring corporate good citizenship and be pro-active, 
not just as to particular issues but more holistically. 
 
 
34. I have attempted in other works to develop a principled basis to 
distinguish among various pressures. See Claire A. Hill, Repugnant 
Business Models: Preliminary Thoughts on a Research and Policy 
Agenda, 74 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 973 (2017); Claire A. Hill, Cheap 
Sentiment, 81 L. & Contemp. Probs. 67 (2018); Claire A. Hill, 
Marshalling Reputation to Limit Problematic Business Conduct, 99 B.U. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019). 
